State ownership and corruption by Billon, Steve & Gillanders, Robert
State Ownership and Corruption∗
Steve Billon† Robert Gillanders‡
November 2015
Abstract
We test two interesting results that can be obtained from a simplified version of
the theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that studies bargaining between
politicians and managers of state-owned firms. The model suggests that firms with
more state ownership tend to pay less in bribes but not have a different experience of
costly obstacles imposed on them by politicians. In our full sample, the results suggest
that a one percent increase in state ownership is associated with a $125 reduction in the
total annual informal payment of the firm and with a 0.5% decrease in the probability
that a firm will consider corruption to be an obstacle to their current operations. We
refine these average relationships by splitting the sample by global region. Only in our
Europe and Central Asia sample do we find strong evidence in support of the first result
and again we find a significant effect of state ownership on obstacles.
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1 Introduction
In the traditional public finance approach, the intervention of the state is often seen as an
efficient cure to solve market failures such as the inadequate provision of public goods or
the presence of externalities in the consumption or in the production of a private good.
In this view, the objectives of politicians who influence public enterprises are in line with
those of the general public and state-owned enterprises help to maximise social welfare as
they internalise the social cost in the decision process of production, yielding an efficient
outcome. In contrast, Shleifer (1998) argues that self-interested politicians exchange votes
from political supporters for benefits to these particular interest groups or directly extract
bribes from the state-owned enterprise, so that state ownership leads to inefficiency and
corruption.
Empirically, the literature suggests that a reallocation of ownership in state-owned en-
terprises in favour of private ownership does not seem to lead to less corruption non-
ambiguously. For instance, Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) highlight that the experience
of sharp privatisation in the transition economies of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were accompanied by a substantial increase in the per-
ception of corruption as well as the relative importance of the unofficial economy. However,
they argue that it is possible to design optimal programs of privatisation that reduce the
opportunities for corruption by government officials.
This paper contributes to the literature on privatisation and corruption in two ways. Firstly,
we provide additional and refined empirical evidence that supports the often made claim
that privatisation leads to more corruption in the form of bribery. As we will outline below,
this is a question that has been asked before but we refine the analysis somewhat by using a
continuous measure of state ownership and supporting the analysis with a theoretical model.
Our second contribution is more novel in that we ask if state ownership changes the degree
to which corruption is an obstacle in general to firms. This is the first time, to our knowledge
that the hypothesis that state ownership affects the perception of corruption as an obstacle
for the activity of enterprises is tested formally.
Few models have been developed to analyse theoretically the relationship between the own-
ership structure of enterprises and corruption. Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005) stress a link
between market concentration and corruption that works in two ways. On the one hand,
the search for rent extraction may lead politicians to strategically sell a public enterprise to
one enterprise that will obtain a monopoly position. The rational behind such behaviour
is that it maximises the acquisition price of a state-owned enterprise. On the other hand,
the acquiring firm in the post-privatized economy may benefit from its newly monopolistic
position to engage in corruption in order to secure its advantage. In this case, privatisation
leads to more corruption through a greater concentration of the privatised market.
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Another notable contribution is provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1994). In this paper, we
use a simplified version of their model to investigate how a reallocation of ownership in firms
affects their experience of corruption. The model is composed of three agents: the public
sector (the Treasury) which owns a share of firms, the politician and the firm’s manager. The
politician and the manager interact with each other through bribes and obstacles imposed
on firms. In equilibrium, the politician set obstacles in such a way that he equalises the
marginal benefit from the obstacles on enterprises with their marginal cost. We then look at
the effect of a reallocation of ownership on obstacles and bribes. In line with the experience
of the privatisation in the FSU and CEE countries, we find that a decrease in state ownership
leads to an increase in the level of bribes. However, the level of obstacles imposed does not
change with state ownership.
We then bring these theoretical results to the data. For this purpose we use the World Bank’s
Enterprise Survey (WBES) which provides detailed information at the firm level. We are
especially interested in the firms’ experience of corruption, measured both in terms of bribe
amounts and the degree to which they feel corruption is an obstacle to their operations. Our
results show that not only the presence of the state in the ownership of a firm but also the
degree of the state ownership has a negative, statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful relationship with both the amount of bribes paid and the probability that corruption
is seen as an obstacle by a firm. In regional sub-samples, we find that the relationship is
particularly relevant in Europe and Central Asia but not for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America.
Several papers have looked empirically at the effect of privatisation on corruption. Fan et al.
(2009), who focus on the relationship between decentralisation and corruption, find that state
ownership decreases corruption. However, their state ownership measure is mainly used as
a control variable and the only information to which they have access is the presence of the
state in the capital of the firm, represented by a dummy variable coded as 1 if any state
agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm and 0 otherwise.
In contrast, we introduce a finer measure of state ownership since we use the percentage
of the firm that is owned by the state. This measure gives information not only on the
presence but also on the strength of this presence in the ownership of the firms. Analysing
the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Survey, Hellman et al. (2000) report that the
frequency of bribe payment as well as the average amount of bribes paid is higher for new
private firms compared to privatised and state owned enterprises. Arikan (2008) shows that
privatisation in the form of lower employment share of state economic enterprises fosters the
perception of corruption. This result is present in a sample of transition economies as well
as in general and is robust to different privatisation indicators.
In the same vein, Boubakri et al. (2009) show that large-scale privatisation in developing
countries increases the risk of corruption as defined in the International Country Risk Guide.
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Focusing on utility companies with a firm-level dataset for 21 transition countries from
eastern Europe and Central Asia, Clarke and Xu (2004) find an ambiguous effect of ownership
on bribe payments. On the one hand, they find that de novo enterprises are more likely to pay
bribes because they have less political power. On the other hand, their results indicate that
on the supply side, the privatisation of utilities significantly decreases both the probability
to pay bribes and its amount as share of revenues. More recently, Koyuncu et al. (2010)
focus on transition economies and regress the same measure of privatisation as in Arikan
(2008) on various macroeconomic indices of corruption, taking into account the possibility
of endogeneity in the relationship. In contrast to previous studies, their results exhibit a
negative effect of all privatisation variables on corruption. Note that most of these papers
only look at the effect of the type of firms (de novo, privatised, state-owned) or some proxy
measure of privatisation on corruption. In contrast, our state ownership variable allows us
to consider a continuum of firms from fully private to fully state-owned and to analyse the
effect of marginal changes in ownership structure on corruption.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a simplified version of the Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) model and derives the main hypotheses regarding the link between state
ownership and corruption. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology used to test
this relationship. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes by discussing some
policy implications.
2 Theory
The simplified version of the model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that we use here to motivate
our empirical analysis describes the relationship between the public, a politician and a firm’s
manager. The capital of the firm is owned in part κ ∈ [0, 1] by the Treasury and in part
(1− κ) by the manager and shareholders. The manager is assumed to follow the objectives
of the shareholders. Let pi be the profit (assumed to be strictly positive) of the firm before it
interacts with the politician. Transfers between the politician and the manager may occur
in two ways: either from the politician to the manager in the form of a subsidies t financed
by the Treasury, or from the manager to the politician in the form of a bribe. Thus Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) envision several channels by which the politicians might influence and
corrupt firms managers. The politicians use a transfer from the Treasury to firms with two
objectives in mind. The first one is to partly finance obstacles they impose on firms and
that bring back a political benefit to them. These obstacles may take the form of excess
employment, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1994). For instance, the government and
the beneficiaries of this excess employment such as politically influential labour unions may
engage in a political market in which votes are exchanged for jobs, as described by the
public choice school. These obstacles may also take the form of regulations Svensson (2003)
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or influence the production of goods in favour of the politician and his political supporters at
the expense of the general public. Second, bribes are a way for the politicians to appropriate
part of the public funds coming from the Treasury in the form of transfers as well as some
of the firm’s profit.
Since the Treasury owns part of the firm’s capital it considers the net transfer, which accounts
for the part of the transfer it receives and the expenditure induced by the constraint it is
liable for as a shareholder:
T = t− κ(t−O)
= (1− κ)t+ κO, (1)
where O represents the obstacles the politician imposes on the manager. The net transfer
incurs a cost δ(T ) on the politician, reflecting the political constraint of using the public
funds of the Treasury for his own interest. On the other hand, the politician enjoys a benefit
γ(O) from the obstacles he imposes on the firm (γ
′
(O) > 0). Note that O, in contrast to the
bribe, does not fall in the politician’s pocket in the form of money. These obstacles might
be for example the employment of individuals that will favor his reelection as in Shleifer
and Vishny (1994). O could also capture politicians obliging managers to purchase other
(possibly inferior) non-labour inputs from sources beneficial to the politician. The utility of
the politician is given by:
Up = γ(O)− δ(T ) + b, (2)
where b is the amount of bribes1 paid and the utility of the manager reads:
Um = (1− κ)(pi + t−O)− b
= (1− κ)pi + T −O − b. (3)
(3) is found by substituting (1) in the utility of the manager. Note that the bribe, as an
informal payment, is not divided between the private and public shareholders (Treasury) of
the firm but is entirely borne by the manager (who is equivalent to the private shareholders
in this model).
We now turn to the objective and strategic variables of the politician. In contrast to Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) who allow the control right over the obstacles O to be devoted either
1It is possible to incorporate an additional constraint on the politician by imposing a political cost of
accepting a bribe, which depends on the size of the bribe. Note however that it does not change, at least for
the case of a constant marginal cost, the main results presented in this section.
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to the politician or to the firm, we assume that the choice over O is always under the
control of the politician. We focus on this case to make clear the effect of a change in the
ownership structure on both b and O. Thus the politician sets the level of obstacles O, the
net transfer T and the bribe b in order to maximize his utility (2) subject to the positive
utility participation constraint of the manager: (1 − κ)pi + T − O − b ≥ 0.2 The relevant
Lagrangian for this problem reads:
` = γ(O)− δ(T ) + b+ λ{(1− κ)pi + T −O − b}, (4)
and the FOCs are:
∂`
∂T
= −δ′(T ) + λ = 0, (5a)
∂`
∂O
= γ′(O)− λ = 0, (5b)
∂`
∂b
= 1− λ = 0, (5c)
∂`
∂λ
= (1− κ)pi + T −O − b = 0. (5d)
Simplifying yields:
γ′(O) = δ′(T ) = 1. (6)
The condition (6) may be viewed as two separate conditions over O and T . It means that
the politician extracts the maximum amount of transfers from the Treasury so as to finance
increases in the obstacles on firms that politically benefit him. However the politician has to
balance the benefits of these obstacles with a political cost which occurs because of possible
sanction for the use of public funds for private interests, for instance in terms of decreasing
probability of being reelected. The transfer extraction from the Treasury continues until the
marginal political benefit of the obstacles is equal to the marginal political cost of the net
transfer. Then the politician extracts the bribe from the utility of the manager by pushing
him to zero net profit.3
2In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1994), we do not consider the case in which the bribe payment is
decided through a bargaining between the politician and the firm’s manager.
3The outcome would be different if the bribe payment were defined through bargaining between the
politician and the firm’s manager. In this case, detailed in Shleifer and Vishny (1994), resources would be
extracted from the Treasury and obstacles would be set according to the condition (6) and the resulting
surplus would be divided between the politician and the manager. However, note that our hypothesis does
not change the qualitative result on the effect of state ownership on bribe payment and obstacle compared
to Shleifer and Vishny (1994)
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Totally differentiating the optimal condition on the net transfer from the Treasury (i.e.
δ′(T ) = 1), we can show, by substituting (5d), the effect of change in the degree of public
ownership in the enterprise on the level of the bribe:
∂b
∂κ
= −pi < 0. (7)
(7) indicates that an increase in the public ownership of the firm leads to a decrease in
the bribe imposed by the politician. The rationale behind this result is that a higher public
ownership drops the profit (1−κ)pi of the firm and thus the potential rent the politician is able
to extract from the manager. If O and T are constant, then an increase in κ implies a lower
bribe payment in order to keep (5d) unchanged. Differentiating the manager’s participation
constraint (5d), we also show that:
∂O
∂κ
= −pi − ∂b
∂κ
= 0, (8)
that is, a change in the ownership structure is neutral with respect to the level of obstacles.
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that this result is a variant of the Coase theorem. No
matter who owns the firm, the obstacles are set at the optimal level and bribes are used to
compensate any deviation from this equilibrium, as we can see in the second term of the
RHS of (8). In the case where there are too little obstacles, the politician compensates the
manager by giving up bribes in order to increase obstacles up to the optimal level. If the
obstacles are too great, the manager compensates the politician by paying bribes in order
to reduce the obstacles to the optimal level.
3 Data
3.1 The Enterprise Surveys
To test the predictions of the model outlined above, namely that state ownership reduces
the amount paid in bribes by a firm and has no effect on the degree to which corruption is
an obstacle to a firm’s operations, we need measures of these two outcomes. Until relatively
recently such finely grained information on corruption was hard to come by, especially if
one desired internationally comparable data for a wide range of countries. Recently how-
ever, the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys and similar projects have begun to document
firms’ (self reported) experiences of corruption. The Enterprise Surveys are representative
firm level surveys that have been carried out in an increasing number of developing and
emerging economies as well as some more developed economies. They provide a wide range
of information on firms’ characteristics, the business environment they operate in, and the
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constraints they face, be they legal, political or other. The dataset we use comes from sur-
veys carried out from 2006 to 2010 inclusive and contains over 55000 firm level observations
from 105 countries though the sample size we can use is dictated primarily by our choice of
dependent variable. The full methodology, including information on sampling, is available
at the Enterprise Surveys website.4
3.2 Corruption Measures
To measure the amount of bribes paid, we make use of the following question:
We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal
payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes,
licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of total annual sales,
or estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal
payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?
Note that the question refers to “establishments like this” in order to help elicit truthful
responses. We use the data for those who chose to give the response in terms of total annual
informal payment rather than as a percent of total annual sales and refer to this as bribe.
We focus on this quantity for two main reasons. Firstly, the theory says nothing about the
quantity bribe/sales. Secondly, when we look at the data we can see that the vast majority
of non-zero responses to the bribe/sales question are multiples of 5. This suggests that
respondents were prone to rounding off their guess as to what the actual value was. This is
in line with the analysis of Clarke (2011) who further argues that when asked to estimate
bribes as a percentage of sales respondents massively overestimate bribe payments.5
Our second dependent variable is derived from a survey question that asks respondents if
corruption is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a major obstacle, or a very severe obstacle to the
current operations of their establishment. From this we create a dummy variable, Obstacle,
that takes a value of one if the firm feels that corruption is a major or very severe obstacle
and zero otherwise. This is our measure of O, the obstacles placed in the way of the firm by
the politician in the model above. Given that this O can be many different things as argued
above, the simplicity and openness of this question are desirable features.
4www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology
5If we do use bribe/sales as our dependent variable we find no relationship with state ownership and it
does not even predict whether bribe/sales was non-zero in probit models. Further, if we create a new variable
for bribe amount by multiplying bribe/sales by our variable measuring sales we fail to find a relationship with
state ownership. We also fail to find a relationship when we create a new bribe/sales variable by dividing
bribe by the sales variable in the dataset. Results available on request.
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3.3 State Ownership
Our explanatory variable of interest comes from a survey question that asks what percent-
age of the firm is owned by private domestic entities, private foreign entities, the govern-
ment/state, and “others”. From this we create a dummy variable that takes a value of one
if the state has any ownership in the firm in line with Fan et al. (2009). However we also
use the continuous nature of the variable. Thus we will be examining whether firms with
any state ownership have lesser corruption problems than those that do not and likewise,
and more in keeping with the theory, if firms with more state ownership do. Using a con-
tinuous variable also allows us to see if the relationship is non-linear - a possibility that the
theoretical model does not consider.
We drop 13 observations. These 13 firms all reported total annual informal payments in
excess of one million dollars (the next highest was roughly $800,000) and had reported
current or past sales that were either extremely high, equal to the reported bribe payment,
or greater than it. Including these 13 firms (12 from Sub-Saharan Africa and one from Latin
America) does not alter the findings in terms of the statistical significance of our main result
but greatly inflates the estimated relationships in the full sample and the Sub-Saharan Africa
sub-sample.
3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all the variables used in this paper. All variables bar
the data on GDP per capita data come from the Enterprise Surveys. The GDP per capita
variable comes from the World Development Indicators. All monetary responses from the
survey data have been adjusted for prices and converted to US dollars. We also report the
summary statistics for the sub-samples of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Europe and Central
Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LCA) and Rest of the World (ROW). The
average firm pays $2746 in informal payments per year though this varies substantially, both
in terms of standard deviations and in terms of global region. Roughly 20% of firms have
had to pay at least something in bribes though again this varies across the globe with 42%
of firms in SSA paying a bribe and only 6% of firms in our ECA sample and 11% in our
LCA sample doing so.
However when we look at the Obstacle variable we can see that the story is somewhat dif-
ferent with 40% of firms overall feeling that corruption is an obstacle to their operations.
The number is still high when we look at the ECA sample and is comparable to the SSA
value while the LCA sample displays a substantially higher value. Whether this is due to
different modalities of corruption manifesting differently in different (general) environments
or is due to a propensity to over or under “complain” about corruption is an open question.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Full Sub-Saharan Europe and Latin America Rest of
Sample Africa Central Asia and Caribbean the World
Bribe 2746.253 6583.454 909.688 1884.423 3824.196
(25760.070) (38883.900) (14804.290) (25908.170) (19288.570)
17458 4132 7254 4680 1392
Bribe Dummy 0.213 0.418 0.057 0.113 0.753
(0.409) (0.493) (0.232) (0.316) (0.431)
17458 4132 7254 4680 1392
Obstacle 0.400 0.329 0.352 0.490 0.344
(0.490) (0.470) (.478) (0.500) (0.475)
53532 13984 11874 21324 6350
State Ownership Dummy 0.016 0.013 0.037 0.004 0.019
(0.125) (0.115) (0.189) (0.064) (0.138)
54470 14187 12436 21134 6713
State Ownership Percentage 0.662 0.572 1.547 0.153 0.812
(6.368) (6.108) (9.729) (3.011) (6.638)
54470 14187 12436 21134 6713
Foreign Ownership Percentage 10.064 13.768 7.663 9.353 8.916
(28.295) (32.592) (24.669) (27.417) (26.740)
54457 14189 12436 21120 6712
Exporter Dummy 0.235 0.118 0.286 0.282 0.238
(0.424) (0.323) (0.452) (0.450) (0.426)
55086 14189 12518 21667 6712
Natural Log of Sales 13.270 12.104 13.955 13.851 12.818
(2.367) (2.288) (2.149) (2.219) (2.274)
50103 13728 10629 19716 6030
Natural Log of GDP per Capita 7.425 6.285 7.779 8.198 6.623
(1.163) (1.038) (0.862) (0.688) (0.564)
54743 14239 12551 21717 6236
Notes: The first entries in the table are means. Standard deviations are given in parentheses and the number of observations is in
italics.
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Corruption could be a hinderance to firms beyond bribes as outlined above and even firms
that are not involved in corruption may feel it is a problem if it helps their rivals to succeed,
discourages investment from abroad (e.g. Wei (2000a), Wei (2000b), and Habib and Zuraw-
icki (2002)) lowers the quality and efficiency of infrastructure and public investment (e.g.
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Bose et al. (2008), Ellis and Fender (2006), Finocchiaro Castro
et al. (2014) and Gillanders (2014)) or leads to one of the other myriad problems identified
in the corruption literature. This difference between the relative levels of each variable cer-
tainly reinforces the need to look at both measures beyond the theoretical motivation and
assertion that both are important and distinct modalities of corruption.
The average firm in our dataset has very little state ownership. Only 0.66% of a firm is
owned by the state on average though this is somewhat higher in ECA at 1.5%. However
we can see that standard deviations are large and that there are firms in every sample with
some degree of state ownership. While only 1.6% of firms overall have some state ownership,
the proportion in ECA is appreciable at 3.7%.
4 Empirical Specification and Results
4.1 Empirical Specification
To test the theoretical predictions regarding the responses of b and O to a change in κ we
estimate models of the following form:
bribeij = α0 +β1SOWNij +β2FOWNij +β3EXPij +β4SALESij +β5GDPPCj + ij (9)
Pr(obstacleij = 1) = Φ(ζ1SOWNij+ζ2FOWNij+ζ3EXPij+ζ4SALESij+ζ5GDPPCj+νij)
(10)
where the subscript ij denotes firm i in country j and the former is estimated by OLS and
the later is a probit model. bribeij and obstacleij are our measures of b and O respectively.
It must be noted that since this measure of O is discrete rather than continuous we do
not have a direct test of ∂O∂κ . However it seems logical to assume that there is a positive
relationship between the level of O and the probability that it is seen as a serious problem.
We refine this somewhat by using an ordered probit model as a robustness test. SOWNij
is our measure of κ, the degree of state ownership in the firm. ij and νij are error terms of
the usual type.
We control for several factors suggested by our intuition and by the existing literature. First
we control for the degree of foreign ownership FOWNij as such firms may stand in different
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relation to bureaucrats than others, could be more or less willing (and able) to pay bribes,
and may present a more guilt-free target to officials. Firms that export may come into
contact with more, and different, officials and so we include a dummy (EXPij) that takes
a value of one if some of the firm’s sales are not national sales. Like Fan et al. (2009) we
control for the size of the firm using the natural logarithm of sales (SALESij). If we use
dummies for the size of the firm in terms of number of employees we obtain the same results.
Finally we control for the level of GDP per capita (GDPPCj) in the firm’s country in line
with the long standing literature that has found that GDP per capita is a significant factor in
determining perceptions of corruption. Good examples of this finding are Ades and Di Tella
(1999), and Svensson (2005). This may help to deal somewhat with the potential for some
cultures at certain stages of the development process to be more prone to “complaining”
about corruption than others.
We also include dummies for industry as some industries are more likely to lend themselves
to both state ownership and to corruption. For similar reasons, we cluster the standard
errors by groups defined by industry and country. This allows errors to be correlated within
industry-country groups. When we split our sample we use more traditional robust standard
errors as the number of clusters can get relatively small. If we do use the clustered standard
errors with our splits, the only important difference is that bribe is significant at 5% in our
SSA sample as opposed to 10%.
4.2 Basic Results
Table 2 presents our main results. Column 1 shows that having any degree of state ownership
lowers the total annual informal payment by almost $4000. This is clearly an economically
meaningful quantity and the result is highly statistically significant. Turning to Column 2,
we can see that when we refine this by using the continuous nature of the data we still find a
highly statistically significant and economically meaningful result. Each percentage of state
ownership lowers the bribe paid by about $125. We find only slight evidence of a non-linear
effect. The squared term is positive though of negligible estimated size and is only significant
at 10%. The results suggest that a firm with 10% state ownership will pay roughly $1250
less in bribes per year than similar firms. These sums, while not astronomical, are unlikely
to be inconsequential for most firms. The theoretical prediction that the bribes paid by firms
should decrease with the level of state ownership seems to hold true in general, though as
we will soon see it does not appear to hold in every environment.
Foreign ownership operates similarly to state ownership though to a smaller degree. Each
percentage of foreign ownership tends to reduce the annual bribe burden by around $20, a
small but statistically significant amount. This is worth contrasting with Fan et al. (2009)
who found that any foreign ownership significantly decreased the frequency of bribery but
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not the amount (as a percentage of sales, categorically measured). Larger firms tend to pay
significantly and substantially more in bribes whereas the opposite is true for firms in richer
countries.
There are clear concerns that one might have with self-reported bribe information and the
large number of zeroes in the sample. One robustness check we can run is to discard most
of the information and simply look at whether state ownership predicts that at least some
amount is paid in bribes. We can see in Column 3 that each percentage of state ownership
reduces the probability of having to pay anything in bribes by about 0.4%. While this may
seem small at first, it is a statistically significant result and implies that a firm with 10%
state ownership is 4% less likely to have to pay any bribes at all relative to similar firms
with no state ownership. Certainly, it is an effect that dwarves that of foreign ownership.
In this specification we find a role for exporter status with exporters being nearly 5% more
likely to have to pay a bribe. Larger firms are no more or less likely to pay a bribe though
firms in richer countries are less likely to do so.
The remaining columns of Table 2 address the second prediction of the model outlined
above. We can see from Column 4 that firms with any state ownership tend to be around
8% less likely to feel that corruption is an obstacle to their operations. Once again this is an
economically meaningful result and is highly statistically significant. However this empirical
result is in contradiction with the theoretical model presented above that predicts that there
is no relationship between obstacles and ownership. However, this contradiction is explicable
if we consider that the theoretical result relies on the Coase theorem.
A well known critique of the Coase theorem is that it may not apply if many contracting
agents (in our case the politicians or the managers) have to agree on a compensation scheme
to reach the optimal level of obstacles. Suppose that state ownership uniformly decreases
in every firm. In order for the incentive compatibility constraint to hold, obstacles should
decrease (holding b constant). Following the Coase theorem, the managers should pay more
bribes in order to come back to the optimal level of obstacles. But if there are many
managers, any individual player finds himself in a classical prisoner’s dilemma. It is his
interest to free ride on the compensation scheme and to let the other managers agree to a
level of bribe payment in order to obtain less obstacles. This is because he will benefit from
the decrease in obstacles without paying for it. As a consequence, no bribe compensation
will emerge to counteract the negative effect of κ on O and the second term, db/dκ, in the
RHS of (8) will vanish. The same argument applies if there are too little obstacles and
many politicians on the political market. In these conditions, it is not surprising to find this
result that contradicts the ideal case of the model where there is only one politician and one
manager.
The final column shows that this result holds when using the continuous measure of state
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Table 2: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Bribe Bribe Dummy Obstacle
Constant 6121.39∗∗ 6101.37∗∗
(2754.14) (2753.14)
State Ownership Dummy -3992.01∗∗∗ -0.0844∗∗∗
(967.91) (0.0201)
State Ownership Percentage -125.24∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗
(35.18) (0.0019) (0.0015)
State Ownership Percentage Squared 0.66∗ 0.0000 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Foreign Ownership Percentage -20.24∗∗ -20.60∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(9.98) (10.04) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Exporter Dummy 128.99 122.95 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0014
(723.75) (724.43) (0.0171) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Natural Log of Sales 1569.65∗∗∗ 1569.82∗∗∗ -0.0012 0.0003 0.0004
(308.58) (308.77) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Natural Log of GDP per Capita -2915.31∗∗ -2914.71∗∗∗ -0.1481∗∗∗ 0.0065 0.0064
(597.63) (598.06) (0.0119) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.0229 0.0229
Observed Probability 0.2363 0.3928 0.3928
Predicted Probability 0.1929 0.3923 0.3923
N 15428 15428 15428 47557 47557
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report OLS coefficients. Columns 3, 4 and 5 report probit marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the country-sector level and are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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ownership. As mentioned above, this is not a direct test of the theoretical prediction as
we do not have a continuous measure of O but it seems logical to assume that there is a
strong link between the level O and the probability of it being seen as an obstacle. Thus
we have empirical evidence that, contrary to the prediction of the theoretical model, more
state ownership decreases the obstacles placed in the way of the firm by corruption.6
We also allowed for the possibility that this relationship is non-linear by including a squared
state ownership term. It seems plausible that while certain levels of state ownership may
shield firms from corruption, extreme levels of state ownership may make a firm the readily
exploitable fiefdom of certain officials. On the other hand, extreme levels of state ownership
could perhaps reinforce the beneficial effect. The results suggest that the former is true
though this non-linear effect is not very large relative to the effect of the level of state
ownership. Foreign ownership also matters though once again it matters to a much lesser
degree than state ownership. The other variables are all insignificant.
As argued by Shleifer (1998), the level of corruption in a society might have an influence
on the structure of ownership. In particular, a highly corrupt government might be less
willing to privatise. In other words, state ownership and corruption may be endogenous
at the macro level. However, the nature of our micro level data on corruption make us
confident that our results are not biased by a similar problem. While it is plausible that
the overall level of corruption influences the state ownership policy of a country, it is less
likely that individual firms’ experiences of corruption result in higher state involvement in
their individual ownership structure in any systematically meaningful way. This argument
is similar to that of Fan et al. (2009) in their context of decentralization and corruption.
Further, the simplified version of the Shleifer and Vishny (1994) model on which we are
basing our analysis provides a strong, logical and, we feel, convincing argument for the
existence of a clear causal mechanism through which the degree of state ownership helps
determine a firm’s experience of corruption.
That said, the macro/micro argument that we are making against reverse causality not being
a particular problem is perhaps stronger when applied to countries that are not dominated by
a small number of large firms.7 In economies dominated by a small number of large firms,
policies regarding state ownership could indeed be distorted by the actions of individual
firms and the opportunities that they present. We therefore divide our sample into groups
delineated by the average share of GDP that can be accounted for by the sales of the firms
in the Enterprise Surveys data. That is we divide each firm’s sales by GDP and take the
national average. The countries with larger numbers of this metric tend to be small and
many have a history of communism. We take three threshold values for our splits: the world
6If we include bribe as an additional control, state ownership is still highly significant and the marginal
effect is larger in magnitude (almost 0.9%).
7We are indebted to Ron Davies for this insight.
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Table 3: Sample Splits by Average GDP Share of Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Percentage of Firm Sales/GDP Above 0.14% Below 0.14% Above 0.05% Below 0.05% Above 0.01% Below 0.01%
Panel A: Bribe
State Ownership Percentage -539.48∗∗ -96.38∗∗∗ -297.77∗∗ -96.04∗∗∗ -245.09∗∗∗ -74.45∗∗∗
(231.18) (33.25) (135.00) (21.39) (72.94) (13.90)
State Ownership Percentage Squared 4.22∗ 0.38 1.79 0.50∗∗ 1.49∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(2.49) (0.38) (1.48) (0.24) (0.79) (0.164)
N 772 14656 1626 13802 3901 11527
Panel B: Obstacles
State Ownership Percentage -0.0042 -0.0058∗∗∗ -0.0043∗∗ -0.0059∗∗∗ -0.0052∗∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0019)
State Ownership Percentage Squared 0.0000 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0001∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N 2721 44835 5487 42070 12974 34583
Notes: All specifications contain the controls from Table 2. Panel A where “Bribe” is the dependent variable reports OLS coefficients.
Panel B where “Obstacle” is the dependent variable reports probit marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and
∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
average of 0.14%, 0.05%, and 0.01%.
Table 3 presents the key results obtained when we run our models on these groups. The first
thing to note is that with the exception of the obstacles model for the above 0.14% sample,
our basic message from Table 2 remains valid. Most importantly, our main findings regarding
state ownership and corruption are strongly significant and economically meaningful in the
countries where our arguments regarding reverse causality are more likely to hold, and
indeed they seem to hold in the other sort of country. The second thing to note is that
the magnitude of the association between state ownership and the level of bribes is much
greater in the “above” groups. This lends some support to the intuition underlying these
splits; in small countries which have a small number of important firms the relationship
between state ownership and corruption might be reinforced from both directions. Finally,
note that the magnitudes of the relationships in the less dependent samples are reasonably
similar to those found in Table 2. This exercise thus give some support to the notion that
the results presented in Table 2 are reasonably safe from this particular endogeneity concern
at least.
4.3 Extensions
To get somewhat closer to the theoretical quantity O and to provide a sensible robust test,
we made use of the full range of information provided by the survey question from which
we created Obstacle. Table 4 presents the results of this exercise. More state ownership is
associated with a lower probability of a firm feeling that corruption is a moderate, major,
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects for Corruption as an Obstacle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Obstacle Minor Obstacle Moderate Obstacle Major Obstacle Very Severe Obstacle
State Ownership Percentage 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0009)
State Ownership Percentage Squared -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Foreign Ownership Percentage 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Exporter Dummy -0.0064 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0021 0.0051
(0.0072) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0023) (0.0059)
Natural Log of Sales -0.0032∗ -0.0005∗ 0.0001 0.0010∗ 0.0026∗
(0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0015)
Natural Log of GDP per Capita -0.0091 -0.0014 0.0003 0.0030 0.0073
(0.0065) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0052)
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level and are reported in parentheses. ∗,
∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. N = 47557
or very severe obstacle to their operations and a higher probability of feeling that it is
no obstacle or a minor obstacle. Thus we can conclude that our findings with regards to
Obstacle are not the result of the specific way we use the data.
The conclusions one can draw often vary dramatically by the global region under consid-
eration. Certain regions have tended to have different experiences of state ownership. It
is generally good practice to split ones sample by broad geographical region and it makes
particular sense to do so in the context of state ownership and corruption. For example, the
former Soviet states and satellites that can be found in our ECA sample will tend to have
had very different histories of state ownership and control than the countries in our other
samples. Similarly, corruption and general institutional malaise is more common and severe
in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions of the globe. Corruption may be so endemic in
these countries that the theoretical mechanisms outlined above may be irrelevant.8
Table 5 presents the results of our two specifications run on our 4 groups of countries.
Only in the ECA sample do we see strong evidence in favour of the theoretical hypothesis
regarding bribe. The magnitude of the relationship between bribes paid and state ownership
is considerably smaller than in the full sample at $50 but it is highly significant as is the
squared term. The findings in terms of Obstacle are quite similar to those in the full sample.
In SSA, we find no strong evidence of either relationship. We suspect that this is due
8Dreher et al. (2009) stress the importance of institutional quality in the determination of corruption.
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Table 5: Sample Splits by Global Region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Global Region: Sub-Saharan Europe and Latin America Rest of
Africa Central Asia and Caribbean the World
Dependent Variable: Bribe Obstacle Bribe Obstacle Bribe Obstacle Bribe Obstacle
Constant -26926.00∗∗∗ -2448.57 -1364.91 -39264.17∗∗∗
(6968.57) (1660.12) (6394.32) (11517.30)
State Ownership Percentage -430.13∗ 0.0040∗ -49.60∗∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗ 220.56 -0.0056 -61.34 -0.0133∗∗∗
(241.15) (0.0023) (15.30) (0.0018) (298.36) (0.0036) (93.40) (0.0032)
State Ownership Percentage Squared 1.24 -0.0001∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ -2.49 0.0000 0.06 0.0001∗∗∗
(2.55) (0.0000) (0.15) (0.0000) (3.07) (0.0000) (1.18) (0.0000)
Foreign Ownership Percentage -103.83∗∗∗ -0.0002 -9.84∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -6.04 -0.0003∗∗ 12.13 -0.0009∗∗∗
(26.11) (0.0001) (5.40) (0.0002) (11.73) (0.0001) (39.30) (0.0003)
Exporter Dummy 4024.89 0.0264∗ 134.05 -0.0188 732.66 0.0082 1978.81 0.0166
(3069.01) (0.0139) (559.61) (0.0119) (957.88) (0.0090) (1496.98) (0.0185)
Natural Log of Sales 5184.20∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 314.56∗∗∗ -0.0005 592.59∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗ 1046.13∗∗ -0.0019
(719.55) (0.0021) (95.24) (0.0026) (159.44) (0.0019) (478.36) (0.0034)
Natural Log of GDP per Capita -4033.39∗∗∗ -0.0237∗∗∗ -112.48 -0.0675∗∗∗ 184.83 -0.1241∗∗∗ 4463.01∗ -0.0730∗∗∗
(553.79) (0.0041) (204.85) (0.0060) (454.30) (0.0056) (2285.90) (0.0131)
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.0800 0.0050 0.0094 0.06
Observed Probability 0.3243 0.3412 0.4878 0.3257
Predicted Probability 0.3227 0.3383 0.4876 0.3212
N 4026 13437 6081 10008 3942 18831 1379 5281
Notes: Columns where “Bribe” is the dependent variable report OLS coefficients. Columns where “Obstacle” is the dependent variable
report probit marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
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to the pervasive nature of corruption in SSA. That said, as the state ownership variable
is significant at 10% and the magnitude of the association with bribe is rather large and
negative, policymakers thinking about privatisation or reducing corruption in SSA may be
interested in these results, though the association with Obstacle is positive. In LAC we don’t
see any evidence of either relationship and in the RoW sample we only find a relationship
with Obstacle, though this is a rather small and heterogeneous sample.
Finally, we looked for specific ways in which state ownership might make corruption less
of an obstacle for firms. We failed to find any relationship between the degree of state
ownership and the probability of having to pay a bribe in the specific circumstances of
obtaining a construction permit, during tax inspections, obtaining an operating license, or
with the percentage of a government contract that must be paid in informal gifts in order
to secure the contract. At the macro level Breen and Gillanders (2012) found that the level
of corruption in a country was a determinant of the ease of doing business in that country.
However, we also failed to find a relationship between state ownership and bureaucratic
constraints such as the days it takes for imports and exports to clear customs, time spent
dealing with government regulations, losses due to crime, and the probability of the firm
finding any of the following to be an obstacle to their operations: tax administration, the
courts, obtaining business licenses and permits, zoning, and customs. Once again these
findings, full results of which are available on request, stand somewhat in contrast with
those of Fan et al. (2009) who found a link between their state ownership dummy and the
frequency of bribery for purposes of business licenses, tax collection, government contracts,
public utilities, customs, and the courts. We tentatively propose that these results suggest
that the Obstacle variable is capturing the outcomes of machine type politics (e.g. “jobs for
the boys”), which is line with the motivation used in Shleifer and Vishny (1994).
5 Conclusions
Using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys we have found partial empirical sup-
port for theoretical predictions arising from a simplified version of the model presented in
Shleifer and Vishny (1994). The percentage of state ownership in a firm significantly and
substantially decreases the amount of bribes that the firm has to pay and reduces the proba-
bility that corruption is seen as an obstacle to the firm’s operations. The second result, while
not consistent with the prediction of the model, is easily explained by free-riding incentives
that invalidate the Coase theorem. Specifically, we found in our baseline estimation that
each additional one percentage of state ownership reduces the total annual informal payment
by $125 and decreases by about 0.5% the probability that a firm will consider corruption to
be an obstacle to their current operations. As one might expect, there is substantial regional
heterogeneity.
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Our results have practical policy implications. Policy makers, at least in Europe and Central
Asia, who are concerned about reducing corruption may wish to reconsider their attitudes to
privatisation. We have shown that any degree of state involvement in ownership is beneficial
in terms of a firm’s experiences of corruption. Of course we are not saying that privatisation
is a bad policy. Though Birdsall and Nellis (2003) argue that privatisation is perhaps not a
good policy in terms of equality, there is a long standing literature that tends to conclude
that privatisation is good in terms of efficiency. Eckel et al. (1997) show this in the specific
case of the privatisation of British Airways and Megginson and Netter (2001) and Estrin
et al. (2009) provide good overviews of this literature. Gupta (2005) shows that even partial
privatisation has a positive effect on firm performance.
This paper raises the possibility of the existence of a trade off between the efficiency benefits
and the corruption costs of privatisation. Decreasing the degree of state ownership in a firm
in order to achieve the performance gains commonly found in the literature will probably be
done at the cost of an increased burden of corruption on the firm and thus on society. While
the result of this trade off is beyond the scope of this paper, our empirical findings and the
theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) stress that the case for privatisation is less
obvious than some might think and many previous studies have suggested.
19
References
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption, American economic
review 89(4): 982–993.
Arikan, G. G. (2008). How privatizations affect the level of perceived corruption, Public
Finance Review 36(6): 706–727.
Birdsall, N. and Nellis, J. (2003). Winners and losers: Assessing the distributional impact
of privatization, World Development 31(10): 1617–1633.
Bjorvatn, K. and Soreide, T. (2005). Corruption and privatization, European Journal of
Political Economy 21(4): 903–914.
Bose, N., Capasso, S. and Murshid, A. (2008). Threshold effects of corruption: Theory and
evidence, World Development 36(7): 1173–1191.
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. P. and Smaoui, H. (2009). Does privatization foster changes in the
quality of legal institutions?, Journal of Financial Research 32(2): 169–197.
Breen, M. and Gillanders, R. (2012). Corruption, institutions and regulation, Economics of
Governance 13(3): 263–285.
Clarke, G. R. (2011). How petty is petty corruption? evidence from firm surveys in africa,
World Development 39(7): 1122–1132.
Clarke, G. R. G. and Xu, L. C. (2004). Privatization, competition, and corruption: How
characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 88(9-10): 2067–2097.
Dreher, A., Kotsogiannis, C. and McCorriston, S. (2009). How do institutions affect corrup-
tion and the shadow economy?, International Tax and Public Finance 16(6): 773–796.
Eckel, C., Eckel, D. and Singal, V. (1997). Privatization and efficiency: Industry effects of
the sale of british airways, Journal of Financial Economics 43(2): 275–298.
Ellis, C. and Fender, J. (2006). Corruption and transparency in a growth model, Interna-
tional Tax and Public Finance 13(2): 115–149.
Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kocˇenda, E. and Svejnar, J. (2009). The effects of privatization
and ownership in transition economies, Journal of Economic Literature 47(3): 699–728.
Fan, C., Simon Lin, C. and Treisman, D. (2009). Political decentralization and corruption:
Evidence from around the world, Journal of Public Economics 93(1-2): 14–34.
20
Finocchiaro Castro, M., Guccio, C. and Rizzo, I. (2014). An assessment of the waste effects of
corruption on infrastructure provision, International Tax and Public Finance 21(4): 813–
843.
Gillanders, R. (2014). Corruption and infrastructure at the country and regional level,
Journal of Development Studies . forthcoming.
URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220388.2013.858126
Gupta, N. (2005). Partial privatization and firm performance, The Journal of Finance
60(2): 987–1015.
Habib, M. and Zurawicki, L. (2002). Corruption and foreign direct investment, Journal of
International Business Studies 33(2): 291–307.
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., Schankerman, M. and Kaufmann, D. (2000). Measuring gover-
nance, corruption and state capture: How firms and bureaucrats shape the business envi-
ronment in transition economies, Policy research working paper 2312, The World Bank.
Kaufmann, D. and Siegelbaum, P. (1997). Privatisation and corruption in transition
economies, Journal of International Affairs 50(2): 419–458.
Koyuncu, C., Ozturkler, H. and Yilmaz, R. (2010). Privatization and corruption in transition
economies: A panel study, Journal of Economic Policy Reform 13(3): 277–284.
Megginson, W. L. and Netter, J. M. (2001). From state to market: A survey of empirical
studies on privatization, Journal of Economic Literature 39(2): 321–389.
Shleifer, A. (1998). State versus private ownership, Journal of Economic Perspectives
12(4): 133–150.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1994). Politicians and firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics
109(4): 995–1025.
Svensson, J. (2003). Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross section of
firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 207–230.
Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption, The Journal of Economic Perspectives
19(3): 19–42.
Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H. (1997). Corruption, public investment, and growth, IMF Working
Paper WP/97/139, IMF.
Wei, S.-J. (2000a). How taxing is corruption on international investors?, Review of economics
and statistics 82(1): 1–11.
Wei, S.-J. (2000b). Local corruption and global capital flows, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity 31(2): 303–346.
21
